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Editors' Summary 
THE  BROOKINGS  PANEL  on Economic Activity held its sixty-third 
conference  in Washington,  D.C., on March  27 and  28, 1997. This issue 
of  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity  includes  the  papers  and 
discussions presented  at that conference. In light of the great increase 
in U.S.  immigration  and trade  since the 1960, the first  paper  estimates 
the impacts  of these two factors on the labor market  outcomes of U.S. 
natives. The second paper  examines the effects of systematic  monetary 
policy on the economy, disentangling  these effects from the effects of 
other shocks, such as OPEC oil price increases. The third considers 
public resistance  to the indexation  of long-term  contracts,  using survey 
data  from the United States and from  Turkey-a  country  with high and 
variable inflation. The fourth examines to what extent and by what 
means  families are able to smooth  year-to-year  variation  in the earnings 
of the household head. The fifth paper addresses recent criticisms of 
the procedures  used by the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  in accounting  for 
quality  change in the Consumer  Price Index. And the sixth assesses the 
performance  and prospects of Brazil's stabilization and economic re- 
form under  the Real Plan. 
OVER  THE  PAST  two decades, the United States has experienced  high 
rates  of immigration  and a rapid  growth  of imports  from  less developed 
countries (LDCs). Over this same period, the earnings of less skilled 
U.S. workers  have declined markedly  relative to the earnings  of other 
U.S. workers.  In the first  paper  of this volume, George Borjas, Richard 
Freeman,  and Lawrence  Katz analyze how these trends  in immigration 
and trade have affected relative wages in the United States and, in 
particular,  the extent to which they have contributed  to the large  decline 
in the relative wages of  less  skilled, low-paid U.S.  workers. Such 
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questions  underlie  ongoing policy debates  in this country  and  have been 
the subject of  considerable economic research in recent years. The 
authors  summarize  the main facts on trade, immigration  and relative 
wages,  evaluate  recent  research  in this  area,  and present  their 
own model quantifying how immigration and trade impact the U.S. 
economy. 
The authors  first  analyze  immigration,  which  began  to surge  soon after 
1965 amendments  to the immigration  laws, reversing  a long downward 
trend  in the proportion  of the population  that  is foreign-born.  The authors 
calculate that between 1970 and 1996, the foreign-born  share of  the 
population  nearly  doubled  from  a  low  of  4.8  percent  to 
9.3 percent. Its composition changed sharply too. Whereas in 1970, 
68 percent of the foreign-born had come from Canada and Europe 
(down  from  84 percent  in 1960), by 1990 only 26 percent  had  come from 
these regions. The destination  of immigrants  was concentrated.  In 1990, 
75 percent  of them  lived in the six main  immigrant-receiving  states:  Cal- 
ifornia, New York, Texas, Florida,  New Jersey, and Illinois. Over 33 
percent  lived in California  alone. This wave of immigration  represented  a 
sizable  shock to the labor  supply  in these regions. 
The authors,  along with most others  who have studied  relative  wages, 
mainly  use educational  attainment  as a proxy  for skills, and also provide 
results  using place in the income distribution  as a skill proxy. Although 
not all immigrants  are poorly  educated,  the authors  show that  they have 
been increasingly  concentrated  in the lower educational  categories. By 
1995 in California,  with its large immigrant  population,  90 percent  of 
workers  with  fewer  than  nine  years  of schooling  and  68 percent  of workers 
with fewer than  twelve years  of schooling  were immigrants.  The authors 
also document  that  immigrants  are  widely  employed  in services  and  trade, 
as well as in manufacturing  and  agriculture;  native  workers  in most  sectors 
have faced competition  from  immigrants. 
Borjas,  Freeman,  and  Katz  demonstrate  why it is difficult  to determine 
the effects of immigration  on relative wages, reviewing several earlier 
studies  along the way. They first  point out the pitfalls  of simply looking 
at the relative performance  of high-immigration  states like California. 
Doing so would be valid only if,  across areas, immigrant  flows were 
uncorrelated  with economic conditions, and natives did not themselves 
migrate  in response  to immigration  to an area.  However,  neither  condition 
is met. To deal with this, the authors  first  turn  to regressions  that  control William  C. Brainard  and George L. Perry  xi 
for forces that  could be expected  to change  regional  wage structures  over 
time. But even with regressions  that  use education-specific  supply  shocks 
as the measure  of immigrant  penetration,  and that net out relative  wage 
changes that occur at the national  level, as well as the impact  of state 
economic  activity  on all natives  residing  in a state,  they still cannot  iden- 
tify consistent  effects of immigration  on relative  wages. They infer that 
immigration  is not a major  determinant  of the regional  structure  of wages 
for natives. 
In light of this negative finding, the authors  consider  whether  native 
internal  migration  diffuses the effects of immigration  from particular  re- 
gions to the country  as a whole. The experience  of California,  the major 
immigrant-receiving  state, provides  a clue that this mechanism  may be 
important.  From 1950 to  1970, before the surge of immigration,  the 
fraction  of U.S. natives  who live in California  rose rapidly.  The fraction 
barely  changed  from 1970 to 1990, even though  California's  share  of the 
total population  kept growing. Over this period, its growth  shifted  from 
in-migration  of natives  to immigration.  The authors  suggest the flow of 
immigrants  to California  displaced  the native net migration  that would 
have otherwise  occurred  and  thus diffused  the economic  effects of immi- 
gration  from  California  to the rest of the country. 
The authors  support  this suggestion  with a cross-state  regression  that 
explains  the change  in a state's  native  population  growth  by the change  in 
the state's immigration  growth.  This regression  gives a substantial  nega- 
tive coefficient  on the change  in immigration  growth.  The authors  go on 
to examine  the  response  of native  flows  by particular  skill groups,  allowing 
for both  the initial  skill distribution  of each state's  work  force and  the rate 
at which  this distribution  was changing  before  1970. Their  results  indicate 
that immigration  does not alter the distribution  of skill groups  within a 
state. The response  of native migration  roughly  counterbalances  the im- 
migrant  shock  by skill groups. 
Having established  that the effects of immigration  on relative  wages 
must  be examined  for the economy  as a whole, rather  than  across  regions, 
Borjas,  Freeman,  and  Katz  turn  to an analysis  of aggregate  factor  propor- 
tions in which they estimate  the effects of trade  and immigration  simul- 
taneously,  recognizing  that  both  can be analyzed  as competing  with  native 
factors  of production.  They postulate  a general  constant  elasticity  of sub- 
stitution  aggregate  production  function,  using skilled  and unskilled  labor 
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types of labor  depend  on the relative  supplies  of each, and  the size of the 
effect depends  on the elasticity  of substitution.  Immigration  and  the labor 
embodied in trade thus affect relative wages by affecting the relative 
supply  of each type of labor.  To keep their  analysis  tractable,  the authors 
use broad  skill groupings  of workers-such as high  school  dropouts  versus 
others,  or workers  above  versus  workers  below the twentieth  percentile  in 
the income distribution.  They apply wage elasticities  based on previous 
studies  to the labor  supply  changes  coming  from  immigration  and  trade  to 
calculate  the effects of these changes on relative wages for these skill 
groups. 
The authors  discuss some potential  criticisms  of this general  model. 
The model assumes  that  the global  economy  is not so integrated  that  only 
world, rather  than  national,  demand  and supply  conditions  affect  relative 
wages by skill class; they cite numerous  studies  supporting  this assump- 
tion. To deal with ambiguities  in assigning  natives, immigrants,  and for- 
eign workers  who produce  U.S. imports  to comparable  skill groups,  they 
use alternative  educational  categories  and define  skill categories  by posi- 
tion in the native  earnings  distribution,  as well as by education.  They also 
discuss circumstances  under  which the full effect of trade  on wages may 
not be captured  by the labor  content  in the flow of traded  goods, but  argue 
that their estimates are unlikely to greatly understate  trade effects by 
ignoring  them. 
The authors  provide  a range  of results  arising  from  the many alterna- 
tives they consider.  For  the effects of immigration,  their  main  findings  are 
robust  across  these alternatives.  The important  effects are  concentrated  on 
high school dropouts,  the least skilled group in the native population. 
With their preferred  relative wage elasticity of  - 0.322,  the inflow of 
immigrants  since 1979  accounts  for  44 percent  of the  decline  in the  relative 
earnings  of native  dropouts  from  1980  to 1995. Using  the  place  of workers 
in the earnings  distribution  rather  than educational  attainment  to define 
skill groups  provides  somewhat  lower, though  still pronounced,  estimates 
of the effects of immigration  on low-wage  workers.  This difference  arises 
mainly because with the earnings-based  classification,  the proportion  of 
natives  who are in the group  remains  unchanged,  whereas  with the edu- 
cational  classification,  the share  of natives  who are  dropouts  declines  over 
the same  interval.  Comparing  higher  skill groups,  such as high school and 
college graduates,  the effect of immigration  on relative  labor  supplies  is William  C. Brainard  and George L. Perry  xiii 
too small to have an important  effect on relative  wages under  any of the 
alternative  estimates. 
Turning  to trade,  the authors  show that, under  plausible  assumptions 
about  production  technologies,  trade  with developed  nations  has had  little 
effect on the skill distribution  of labor  supplies.  They  therefore  concentrate 
on the effects of trade  with less developed  countries,  which  may  have had 
substantial  effects on the relative  supplies  of low-skill workers.  In this 
analysis, they acknowledge  the difficulty  of measuring  the relative  labor 
content  of goods involved  in LDC  trade:  they can infer  the output  affected 
by trade  at the level of three-digit  industries;  but within each industry, 
trade  may supplant  not the average  firm,  but  relatively  less efficient  firms 
that  use relatively  less skilled  workers.  To deal with this possibility,  they 
provide  estimates  using three  alternative  assumptions.  In the low impact 
assumption,  LDC imports  displace production  from firms that use the 
contemporary  average skills and productivity  of their industry.  In the 
middle assumption,  which the authors  prefer, the imports  displace  pro- 
duction  from  firms  that  use the skills and  productivity  of the average  firm 
in their industry  as of ten or fifteen years ago. In the high assumption, 
LDC imports  displace  production  that  uses the skills and  productivity  of 
the industry's  average  firm  in 1970. In all cases, exports  are assumed  to 
expand  production  using average  current  skills and productivity  for the 
industry. 
To evaluate  trade  effects, the authors  first  calculate  the labor  embodied 
in LDC imports  and exports, disaggregating  by industry  and by country 
of origin  or receipt  and  using  the three  alternative  estimates  of labor  input 
by industry  described  above. The estimates  are substantially  affected  by 
the alternative  used. Using the high alternative-assumptions  that the 
authors  regard  as extreme-growth in LDC trade  accounts  for 27 percent 
of the decline in the relative  wages of high school dropouts.  Under  their 
preferred  middle alternative,  the growth  in trade  with LDCs since 1979 
accounts  for only 8 percent  of the decline in relative  wages of dropouts. 
The effect of trade  on wages is a little more  than  half this large  under  the 
low alternative. 
The authors  draw  several  broad  conclusions  from this study. Consid- 
ering the entire U.S.  work force, the effects of immigration  and trade 
flows  on relative  skill supplies  have  not  been  substantial  enough  to account 
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nor more than a modest part of the growing college-high school wage 
differential.  They have  been more  important  in contributing  to the relative 
wage decline of high school dropouts  since 1980. For this group, using 
the  authors'  preferred  alternative  for  measuring  trade  impacts,  immigration 
and  trade  together  account  for roughly  half of the decline, with immigra- 
tion by far the more  important  of the two. 
M  A N Y  O B S E  R  V ER  S have come to believe that monetary  policy is the 
major, if not the dominant, source of economic fluctuations.  Each of 
the four major  recessions since 1965 has been associated with a mon- 
etary tightening. Yet a considerable  body of recent research  attributes 
relatively little of the overall variation  in output to monetary  shocks. 
This research,  based on vector autoregressions  (VARs), makes a sharp 
distinction between monetary  policy innovations and the endogenous 
response of policy. In a typical specification, for example, policy is 
credited  only with the economy's response  to innovations-movements 
in the federal funds rate that cannot be forecast by other economic 
variables included in the system. Using this VAR methodology mini- 
mizes the chance that policy will be credited  with causing movements 
in output when, in fact, policy is responding to output or to other 
variables  that  are  causing the output  fluctuations.  However, it also does 
not credit policy with economic responses flowing from normal  policy 
reactions  to events. The standard  VAR models are silent on the impor- 
tance of endogenous responses of policy to the economy's behavior. 
Nor do they provide  a basis for predicting  the consequence  of changing 
the policy rules governing monetary  behavior. In the second paper of 
this issue, Ben Bernanke, Mark  Gertler, and Mark  Watson attempt  to 
assess the importance  of the endogenous  component  of monetary  policy 
by restricting the way policy interacts with the economy, while not 
restricting  other  coefficients in the model. The authors  focus on the role 
of oil prices in their  analysis, both because oil prices have been subject 
to large exogenous shocks and  because such shocks compete  with mon- 
etary  policy in statistical  explanations  of economic fluctuations. 
The authors  begin with a brief review of earlier work that assesses 
the importance  of monetary  policy and oil shocks, documenting  that 
essentially all recessions of the past thirty  years have been preceded  by 
both oil price increases and a tightening  of monetary  policy. In order 
to distinguish  the endogenous and exogenous movements  in oil prices William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xv 
and monetary  policy and to disentangle  the effects of these two varia- 
bles, the authors estimate a five-variable VAR on monthly data that 
includes, in order, real GDP, the GDP deflator, an index of spot com- 
modity prices, an indicator  of the state of the oil market,  and the level 
of the federal funds rate. Ordering  the macroeconomic  economic vari- 
ables ahead of oil prices and the federal funds rate corresponds  to the 
plausible assumption  that the effects of the latter on the economy lag 
by at least one month. The authors  try four alternative  measures  of the 
state of the oil market  and find that  the simplest-the  nominal  price of 
crude  oil-implies  anomalous  responses of both output  and prices to a 
shock. The other three measures  give more sensible impulse response 
functions, implying that output  falls and prices rise following a shock. 
In general, responses are modest in magnitude  and statistically insig- 
nificant. In the authors' view, the most sensible results come from a 
measUre  constructed  by James Hamilton, which ignores oil price in- 
creases  that  do not exceed the maximum  value achieved  in the preceding 
twelve months. A 10 percent  shock to this measure  results in a modest 
0.45 percent  cumulative  loss in GDP over four years. They note, how- 
ever, that the economic and statistical significance of oil price shocks 
is larger in the more elaborate  models that they estimate subsequently. 
Most observers believe that the reductions  in output that have fol- 
lowed oil price increases  are too large to be explained  by oil alone, and 
that part of the output decline reflects the contractionary  response of 
monetary  policy. Indeed, in the basic VAR model an unexpected in- 
crease in the price of oil, using any of the measures,  results  in monetary 
tightening;  part  of the subsequent  reduction  in output  is hence attributed 
to the reaction of the monetary authority. The authors quantify this 
response  by means  of a technique  previously  used by Christopher  Sims 
and Tao Zha. This amounts to "shutting down" the response of the 
federal funds rate as estimated by the VAR, so that the federal funds 
rate follows the path that it would have taken in the absence of the 
exogenous shock to oil.  The authors here assume that the other co- 
efficients of the model are invariant  to this hypothesized change in 
policy behavior, and note that this assumption  is subject to the Lucas 
critique. Although they are sympathetic  to Sims's view that this may 
not be a major  problem  for deviations from historical  behavior  that are 
neither  too large nor too protracted,  they suggest that the relevance of 
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of the economy. This leads them to propose  a modification  of the Sims- 
Zha procedure that assumes that financial markets quickly reflect 
changes in the policy rule, forming rational expectations of interest 
rates in the changed environment. They assume that equations other 
than those relating  to interest  rates are invariant  to the change in rule. 
To implement these ideas, Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson let the 
federal funds rate affect macroeconomic  variables such as output and 
prices  only indirectly,  through  its effect on short-  and  long-term  interest 
rates. Because they rule out other possible channels of influence for 
monetary  policy, such as the exchange rate and the "credit channel," 
they regard  their  results  as a lower bound  on the importance  of monetary 
policy.  They also follow the common practice of assuming that the 
other macroeconomic variables in their system are causally prior to 
market rates-that  is,  interest rates cannot affect output and prices 
within the month. For most of their analysis they also treat  the federal 
funds rate as causally prior to market rates, in effect assuming no 
response of  policymakers to movements in market rates within the 
month, on the grounds  that market  rates contain no information  about 
the economy that is not already present in the other macroeconomic 
variables. 
In order  to incorporate  the expectations  theory in the rate  equations, 
as is required  in their method, the authors  decompose short and long 
rates into two parts:  expectations  of future  values of the funds rate and 
a term premium. Rather  than estimate the weights on future expected 
funds rates, they assume the weights appropriate  to a fixed discount 
rate of 4 percent. Given this assumption, it is easy to decompose any 
predicted  change in the market  rates into its two components. For ex- 
ample, to simulate  the effects of an oil price shock under  a counterfac- 
tual policy regime, they first specify an alternative  path  for the federal 
funds rate and calculate the change in the expectations component  of 
interest  rates implied by this modified  behavior. With the time path of 
the expectations  component  of market  rates determined,  they can then 
trace  out the impulse  responses  of each of the other  variables,  including 
the term premium  itself. Because the term premium  varies even with 
their rational  expectations assumption, market  rates do not move one 
for one with expectations. 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson report a number  of policy experi- 
ments with their seven-variable  model. They first show that the basic William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xvii 
system incorporating  short and long rates gives familiar  predictions  of 
the responses of output and prices to a federal funds rate innovation. 
The response  of market  rates  is interesting:  the short  rate  term  premium 
is significantly  negative immediately  following a funds  rate  innovation, 
indicating  that  short  rates  respond  less than  implied  by the expectations 
hypothesis. This discrepancy  quickly disappears  for short term rates, 
so that  the expectations  theory  seems to be a reasonable  approximation 
of reality. However, expectations  about  future  short  rates explain rela- 
tively little of the movement  in the ten-year  government  bond  rate, and 
there is some evidence that the long rate "overreacts" to short rates. 
The most extensive exercise is the decomposition  of the impact of 
oil shocks into direct  effects and  indirect  effects that  reflect  endogenous 
monetary policy.  The authors provide a base case that includes tile 
estimated endogenous response of monetary  policy and two scenarios 
intended  to show how differently the economy would have performed 
in the absence of the policy response to the oil shock. One of these 
scenarios  follows the Sims-Zha  procedure,  simply setting  the funds  rate 
at the value that it would have had in the absence  of the oil shock, with 
the market  rates following in accord with the unconstrained  reduced- 
form  estimates. The second, "anticipated  policy," scenario  applies  the 
authors'  methodology  described  above. Short  and long term  premiums 
are assumed to respond as estimated, but the expectations component 
of rates is made  consistent  with the counterfactual  course of the federal 
funds rate. Both scenarios exhibit the qualitative  behavior one might 
expect in the absence of policy tightening-that  is, higher paths for 
output and price. The effects of induced policy seem large; in their 
absence, most of the output loss from the oil shock disappears  and 
higher rates of inflation  persist instead of turning  down after a couple 
of years, as they do in the base case. The two scenarios show roughly 
similar departures  from the baseline. However, market  interest rates 
are systematically lower in the anticipated  policy scenario than in the 
Sims-Zha scenario. When the endogenous response of the term pre- 
mium is also shut down, so that market  rates do not respond at all to 
the oil shock, endogenous  policy is given less credit  but is still respon- 
sible for two-thirds to three-fourths  of the total output decline. The 
authors  find similar results when they consider shocks to commodity 
prices or output  rather  than to oil. 
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three major  oil price shocks followed by recessions. They find that the 
1974-75 decline in output is largely due to nonoil commodity prices, 
which rose sharply before the recession, rather  than to the oil price 
shock. In contrast, the oil price shocks in 1979 and 1990 and their 
associated endogenous policy responses do appear  to explain the sub- 
sequent declines in output. In order to check the plausibility of their 
findings, the authors  compare  the impulse response of the economy to 
an oil shock and to a pure federal funds shock of a magnitude that 
mimics the effect of the oil shock on rates. The response of output is 
virtually  identical in the two scenarios. The authors  see this as support 
for the view that policy responses are the dominant  source of the real 
effects of an oil price shock. 
The importance  that Bernanke,  Gertler,  and  Watson  attribute  to pol- 
icy, once they recognize the impact  of endogenous  policy responses, is 
in sharp  contrast  to the small role that  they and  others  attribute  to policy 
innovations  alone. They conclude that  analysts  who focus only on pol- 
icy innovations miss much of the contribution  of monetary  policy to 
stabilizing the economy. 
EcONOMISTS  HAVE  LONG  been puzzled by the scarcity of  price 
indexation in long-term contracts. History is replete with episodes in 
which inflation  or deflation  have wreaked  havoc by producing  unfore- 
seen and  major  redistributions  of wealth  between  debtors  and  creditors. 
In the post-World War II period inflation  has been pervasive and var- 
iable, and in most countries  the public has displayed  a strong  antipathy 
to it. Yet, except in a few countries  with extreme experiences, people 
have not taken  the apparently  simple expedient  of tying their  long-term 
financial  commitments  to a price index. In the third  paper  of this issue 
Robert Shiller briefly reviews the reasons why indexation might be 
expected to be the norm  rather  than  the exception, discusses its histor- 
ical precedents, and reports on an extensive survey of individuals in 
the United States and  Turkey, two economies with quite different  infla- 
tionary histories, in an effort to illuminate the puzzling absence of 
indexation. 
It would be easy to understand  the absence of indexation  if inflation 
were predictable and stable. But, Shiller argues, throughout  history 
price levels have been notoriously  unstable  over long periods of time. 
To illustrate  this fact, he computes  the standard  deviations of ten- and William  C. Brainard  and George L. Perry  xix 
twenty-year changes in price levels for sixteen countries during the 
postwar  period. For the twenty-year  change, half of the countries  have 
had standard  deviations of  over 500 percent, with six over 10,000 
percent. Even the United States-the  country  with the third  least vari- 
able price level, after  West Germany  and  Japan-has  a standard  devia- 
tion of 60 percent. It does not take big surprises  in the annual  inflation 
rate to dramatically  change the real value of a long-term  contract.  The 
power of compounding  means that a 2 percent higher average annual 
rate of inflation lowers the real value of a twenty-year  bond by one- 
third at maturity. Inflation uncertainty  clearly makes long-term debt 
very risky in real terms. 
Shiller suggests that indexing is virtually  costless and hence, given 
historical experience and the entreaties  of a long list of distinguished 
economists, he finds it puzzling that indexation  has not become com- 
monplace. He briefly describes the limited experience with the index- 
ation of long-term  contracts  in the United States, where the first infla- 
tion-indexed federal government  bonds were issued in January  1997, 
and describes the few short-lived private initiatives to issue similar 
bonds. Indexation  in labor  contracts  appears  to wax and wane depend- 
ing on the rate of inflation. And Shiller finds little indexation  in other 
private  long-term  contracts, such as alimony, child support,  or private 
pensions. In his view, the U.S.  experience is largely one of missed 
opportunities. 
Shiller sees Turkey as a natural  candidate  to complement  his study 
of the United States. Inflation  in Turkey has been highly variable and 
has not been below 20 percent  per year since the late 1970s. Although 
indexation for long-term contracts is common in many countries that 
have extremely high and variable inflation  rates, in Turkey it is rare. 
While in major  Turkish  cities prices for real estate, apartment  rentals, 
and the like are routinely  quoted in U.S. dollars or deutsche  marks, in 
small towns and rural  areas such prices are typically given in Turkish 
lira. The Turkish government had never issued indexed debt before 
1997. Nor is indexation important  in other types of contracts. Shiller 
reports  on interviews with divorce lawyers, bond dealers, and labor 
union officials, who state that indexation  is almost never used for ali- 
mony, child support,  corporate  bonds, or labor  contracts.  Instead, debt 
and labor contracts are for the short term, and the courts are used to 
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terviewees judged that dollarization is used in about 10 percent of 
alimony  and  child support  settlements,  particularly  for the wealthy, but 
that  corporate  bonds and  labor  contracts  are  never  dollarized.  They also 
suggested that fluctuation  in the exchange rate is one important  reason 
why dollarization  is not common. 
The centerpiece  of Shiller's paper  is a summary  and analysis of his 
survey aimed at finding out public attitudes  about inflation  and index- 
ation. Shiller sent questionnaires  to 800 individuals  in the United States 
and 400 in Turkey, all randomly  selected from local telephone books. 
The response  rates  were 38 percent  for the United States and  25 percent 
for Turkey. A great  deal of care went into survey  design;  early versions 
of the questions  were refined  after  preliminary  informal  interviewing  in 
New Haven, Connecticut;  and two different questionnaires  were used 
for the U.S.  sample, with different  orderings  of answers  and, in some 
cases, with different  wording, to minimize the effect of framing. 
The survey asks an array of questions intended to check out the 
importance  of plausible explanations  for the absence of indexed con- 
tracts. These include the inability  of individuals  to understand  indexed 
contracts  and to do the mathematics  required  to make intelligent com- 
parisons  between different  types of contract;  math  anxiety and aversion 
to complicated  contracts;  skepticism  about  the accuracy  of official price 
indexes; exaggerated  belief in the possibility of off-setting inflation  by 
substituting  less expensive for more expensive items; the absence of 
risk aversion; inaccurate  beliefs about the magnitude  of inflation  risk; 
misperceptions  about  who is hurt  by inflation;  and skepticism  about  the 
government's  behavior  and the likelihood of its changing  the rules. 
Readers  will have different  views about  which of the rich tableau  of 
responses are most interesting  or most surprising.  For the most part, 
there is a remarkable  similarity between U.S.  and Turkish  responses. 
Shiller finds that most of those surveyed do not seem confused about 
inflation  or how indexation  works, and do not have great difficulty in 
making  the calculations  necessary to compare  indexed with unindexed 
plans. While there  is a suggestion  of money illusion on the part  of some 
respondents, a much more important  misconception  is underapprecia- 
tion of the uncertainty  of inflation. Individuals  give low estimates of 
inflation  uncertainty  relative  to historical  variation,  particularly  in Tur- 
key. Another  interesting  theme is that people tend to think of inflation 
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but as an event that harms virtually everyone. They seem to believe 
that real incomes are eroded by high inflation, to the detriment of 
debtors, creditors, firms, and individuals alike. Shiller suggests that 
this may explain why it seems too much  to ask that  noncustodial  parents 
automatically  increase child support  payments if inflation picks up a 
lot, and why workers find it reasonable that the real values of their 
pensions  decline with inflation.  He observes  that  this belief is consistent 
with experience; for fourteen of the sixteen countries he considers, 
unusually high inflation is correlated  with unusually  low rates of real 
output  growth. Respondents  also tend to believe that price indexes are 
not a reliable measure  of how individuals  will be affected by inflation, 
particularly  when it is high, and they have some mistrust  of the gov- 
ernment's construction  of such indexes. He concludes that the lack of 
enthusiasm  for indexation  has no single cause, but that a wide variety 
of thoughts about inflation lead to the belief that indexation is not a 
good,  idea. 
Shiller is an unabashed  proponent  of indexation  and provides a cat- 
alogue of ways in which the government  could promote  public accep- 
tance of indexed debt. The boldest would be to eliminate long-term 
government  nominal debt, replacing it entirely with indexed debt. He 
believes that  if that  were done, indexed  debt  would become the standard 
throughout  the economy. Courts  could routinely index alimony, child 
support, and personal  damage settlements, but Shiller believes that in 
many of these cases it would be better  to index to an income aggregate 
rather  than to the CPI. Ironically, he does not see a strong case for 
institutionalizing  indexation  in labor  markets,  the one arena  in the U  . S. 
private sector where formal indexation has at times been significant. 
Nevertheless,  he believes  that government encouragement of most 
forms of indexed contract  could lead to significant  social benefits. 
FOR  YEARS  the press has been full of stories about corporate  down- 
sizing and  restructuring  and  increased  foreign  competition,  all of which 
are said to contribute  to a decreased  sense of job security  on the part  of 
American  workers.  Such heightened  anxiety  about  job loss is consistent 
with workers'  actual  earnings  experiences. While the typical worker  in 
the U.S.  labor market has always experienced considerable year-to- 
year variation  in earnings, earnings variation  has trended  up since the 
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example, have estimated  that the transitory  component  of the earnings 
of household  heads rose by more than  40 percent  from the 1970s to the 
1980s. In the fourth  paper of this issue Susan Dynarski  and Jonathan 
Gruber  reexamine  the evidence on earnings  variation  and estimate the 
extent to which various mechanisms-including  offsets from the in- 
comes of other  household  members,  cushions  provided  by tax and  trans- 
fer programs,  and  dissaving out of wealth-insulate  consumption  from 
shocks to the earnings  of household heads. They regard  the consump- 
tion variation arising from earnings variation as the indicator of the 
welfare loss of households. 
The authors  begin by reexamining  the importance  of earnings  vari- 
ability during the period 1970 to 1991 for a nationally representative 
sample  of households  with male heads aged twenty to fifty-nine. Draw- 
ing on the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a lon- 
gitudinal survey which follows a cross-section of families over time, 
they extend the sample period  used by Gottschalk  and  Moffitt  and shift 
the focus to total labor earnings, rather  than just wages and salaries. 
To measure  an individual's  transitory  earnings  in a given year, Dynarski 
and Gruber  use regressions for the household head's earnings  that in- 
clude time dummies  to remove variations  that  reflect  aggregate  fluctua- 
tions and a number of individual characteristics:  education, martial 
status and change in that status, change in family size and in the pro- 
portion of the family comprised  by children, and change in a measure 
of family "food needs." Controlling  for these variables  is presumed  to 
remove the predictable  changes in income over the individual's life 
cycle, as well as changes in income that are permanent.  The removal 
of aggregate  fluctuations  allows the authors  to focus on the smoothing 
of idiosyncratic  shocks. The residual from the estimated equation for 
an individual is taken as a measure  of that person's transitory  income 
in a particular  year;  and  the mean  of squared  residuals  across  individuals 
is used as the measure  of aggregate  transitory  variation  in a given year. 
The authors  also run the earnings equation including individual fixed 
effects. Two findings from this analysis stand  out. First, earnings  var- 
iation has a strong  countercyclical  component,  with peaks in the reces- 
sions of the mid-1970s, the early 1980s, and the early 1990s. Second, 
confirming  Gottschalk and Moffitt's earlier findings, annual earnings 
variation  has a strong  upward  trend;  over the entire  period, the variation 
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How important  fluctuations  in the earnings  of the head of household 
are to household welfare depends not only on the magnitude  of those 
fluctuations  but also on the size of changes in taxes, transfers, and 
unemployment  insurance, changes in income from other members  of 
the household, and  the availability  of saving or borrowing  to spread  the 
effects of income shocks across many periods. To estimate the com- 
bined effectiveness of these mechanisms in mitigating the effects of 
shocks, the authors  directly estimate  the response  of changes in house- 
hold consumption  to shocks to the head  of household's income, includ- 
ing the variables that they use in estimating transitory  income. The 
inclusion of these variables  implies that  the coefficient on head's earn- 
ings itself should be interpreted  as the response of consumption to 
transitory  income. Hence the authors  take a zero or small coefficient 
on change in head's earnings as evidence that one or more of  the 
mechanisms  for smoothing  consumption  are important.  If the response 
of consumption is small, the growing variation of transitory earn- 
ings in recent years may, in fact, have little impact  on the welfare of 
households. 
Dynarski  and  Gruber  recognize  that  their  measure  of transitory  income 
does not achieve a clean distinction  between transitory  and permanent 
variations  in income. If shocks to the level of income are transitory,  the 
errors  in the authors'  differenced  equation  should  be negatively  correlated. 
If, however,  errors  in the differenced  equation  are  independent  over time, 
the authors' estimates of transitory  income correspond  to permanent 
changes in the level of income and their effects on the lifetime budget 
constraint  of the household  would  be much  larger.  But they  argue  that  this 
ambiguity  is unimportant,  since they look directly  at the consequences  for 
consumption  of earnings  fluctuations. 
The authors  make  use of two data  sources  to estimate  the consumption 
response  to transitory  earnings:  the PSID, which includes  a set of high- 
quality  indicators  of earnings  and  labor  force attachment,  but has limited 
information  on household  consumption;  and the Bureau  of Labor  Statis- 
tics's Consumer  Expenditure  Survey  (CEX), which  contains  a more  com- 
plete accounting  for consumption,  but has samples  for only two points  in 
time. Earnings  reported  in such recall surveys include substantial  mea- 
surement  error.  In the case of the PSID, for example, it is estimated  that 
15 to 30 percent  of the cross-sectional  variation  in earnings  and 20 to 25 
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Such errors lead to a downward bias in ordinary least squares estimates 
of the response of consumption to income,  and hence to an overestimate 
of  the extent  to  which  households  can  shield  their consumption  from 
earnings fluctuations. The authors deal with this difficulty by means of an 
instrumental variable technique, which only uses the variation in current 
earnings that can be predicted by  a variable that is  independent of  the 
measurement error. Their instrumental  variable is the change in "imputed 
earnings," calculated as the number of hours worked in the previous year 
times the current wage  rate. They argue that change in this variable is 
likely to be a good instrument, with errors uncorrelated with the errors in 
the change in current earnings. 
The authors' results suggest  that households are able to shelter con- 
sumption significantly from adverse shocks to the head's earnings. In the 
case of the PSID, the response of both food and housing (the two available 
consumption variables) to changes in the head of household's earnings is 
quite small. The combined elasticity is only 5 percent using ordinary least 
squares. Estimates using instrumental variables are larger, but still imply 
a total elasticity  of  less  than 20  percent. Allowing  for fixed individual 
household  effects  makes little difference.  Using  the CEX  data, which 
cover a much wider range of consumption items, leads to broadly similar 
conclusions,  but some interesting details emerge. The instrumental vari- 
able estimates of elasticities for food and housing are somewhat smaller 
than for the PSID,  and the elasticities  for medical care and insurance, 
vehicle maintenance and fuel, utilities, and entertainment  are smaller still. 
The main surprise is the low estimate for entertainment. In accord with 
expectations,  the  authors find for both data sets  that the  elasticity  of 
expenditures on food  away from home  is  significantly greater than the 
elasticity of demand for food at home. 
In contrast to the low elasticities for expenditures on most nondurables, 
the CEX data show that durable expenditures, comprising only 11 percent 
of consumption on average, have a larger absolute response than all non- 
durables taken together. For the instrumental variables estimates, the im- 
plied elasticity is eight times larger than it is for nondurables. The authors 
note that this result conforms to the view that a portion of durables pur- 
chases  should be  regarded as  saving,  providing future consumption of 
durable good  services.  Hence  the variation in current consumption and 
utility is overstated by the change in current expenditures. 
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income  may  include  some  permanent components.  They  observe  that 
changes in hours are more likely to be transitory than changes in wage 
rates. Therefore they rerun their equations using  these  two  sources of 
earnings variation as explanatory variables.  For the PSID  sample,  the 
results show a striking difference between the two components, in accord 
with their priors. The response of food and housing consumption to wages 
is much larger than their response to hours. For the CEX data, the results 
are less clear. Food and housing,  in fact, respond more to hours than to 
wages.  However,  both aggregate nondurables and durables have a larger 
response to wages,  and overall the authors believe  that the presumption 
that wage changes have a larger permanent  component is confirmed. They 
find it striking, however, that even in the case of wage variation, most of 
earnings variation is smoothed: consumption changes by less than 30 cents 
for each dollar change in earnings from this source. 
How  important are the various potential sources of  smoothing? Both 
the PSID  and the CEX measure the wife's  labor earnings and provide 
either observations on taxes and transfers or the information necessary to 
calculate them. This enables the authors to directly estimate the response 
of each to changes in the head's earnings. As in the consumption equa- 
tions,  change  in  head's  earnings is  instrumented by  imputed income. 
Dynarski and Gruber find relatively little offset for lost earnings of the 
head through increased earnings of the wife,  but find that transfers and 
taxes are important. The PSID data indicate that changes in government 
transfer income off-set about 12 percent of earnings variation, and taxes, 
including  both  income  and payroll taxes,  off-set  about 35  percent of 
earnings variation. The CEX estimates are somewhat smaller: 5 percent 
and 26 percent, respectively.  Taken together with the authors' estimates 
of the consumption response, these findings imply that 25 to 40 percent 
of  the  year-to-year  changes  in  the  head  of  household's  earnings  is 
smoothed by household saving; if durable goods expenditures are regarded 
as saving, the smoothing attributed  to saving is about 15 percent greater. 
Variations in the household head's earnings that arise from unemploy- 
ment may be harder  for households to smooth than variations arising from 
other sources, both because unemployment is likely to have a large effect 
on earnings and because it may be unplanned, resulting from involuntary 
rather  than voluntary separation. To explore this possibility,  the authors 
use unemployment as  an instrument for earnings in their consumption 
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mation about unemployment duration, they use a dummy for the transition 
from employment to unemployment for a sample of households where, 
ex ante, the head appears to be regularly employed and where the spell of 
unemployment is so long that it is not likely to have been planned. Using 
this constructed variable, they find that for most components of consump- 
tion the results are similar to those for general downward movements in 
earnings. Curiously, the estimated effect on durable goods expenditures 
is substantially smaller than the earlier estimates. The authors  also examine 
how  unemployment-related changes  in  earnings are off-set  by  spousal 
income,  taxes,  and transfers. Their only consistent finding is that unem- 
ployment insurance off-sets  more of earnings variation from this source 
than most previous research has estimated. From 50 to 55 percent of each 
dollar of earnings loss due to unemployment is compensated by increased 
income flows,  and only 20 to 25 percent of each dollar loss is reflected in 
dissaving. 
How plausible is the proposition that households have sufficient wealth 
to  provide this  amount of  smoothing? By  matching households  in the 
PSID and CEX samples with households from the Census Bureau's Survey 
of Income and Program Participation  for the two years that contain infor- 
mation on asset holding and net worth, Dynarski and Gruber show that 
the median household has liquid assets equal to about 35 percent of the 
income loss from an unemployment spell,  and that 36 percent of house- 
holds have assets that are greater than their entire income  loss.  If one 
includes illiquid assets, wealth appears more than adequate to finance the 
degree of consumption smoothing that they estimate. 
Even though the median household appears to have sufficient wealth to 
cover a substantial fraction of the income loss from unemployment, many 
households do not, and these might be expected show much larger reduc- 
tions  in  consumption when  the household  head becomes  unemployed. 
Grouping the households into three categories of educational attainment- 
high school dropouts, high school graduates, and college  graduates-the 
authors find dramatic differences in wealth and hence,  presumably, the 
capacity to smooth adverse income shocks. The median household headed 
by  a high  school  dropout with a job  separation has gross liquid assets 
amounting to only 5 percent of the resulting income loss; by contrast, the 
median household headed by a college  graduate has gross liquid assets of 
1.2 times the income loss, and over three-quarters  of these household have 
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may serve as a good  proxy for wealth.  When the authors estimate the 
consumption response  to  unemployment by  educational group for  the 
PSID, they find that the effects are much larger among households headed 
by high school  dropouts, whereas there is essentially  no effect  of  such 
shocks on the consumption of the highly educated. Using the CEX, the 
results for nondurables expenditures are similar, but somewhat muted. 
However,  there is  an enormous difference  in the response of  durables 
purchases across household types: there is essentially no change in pur- 
chases by households headed by the college  educated and a drop of over 
50 cents on the dollar for households headed by high school dropouts. 
The  finding that the typical household  is  especially  able to  smooth 
earnings shocks arising from variation in hours suggests that, for the entire 
economy,  consumption variation should be less cyclical than income var- 
iation,. Dynarski and Gruber find that this is so.  However,  they also find 
some  anomalous results for the aggregate. Most striking, the growth in 
earnings instability over time is much lower for the college educated than 
for lower educational groups, yet the growth in consumption variation is 
much greater for the college educated. This, along with somewhat differ- 
ent timing in the change in aggregate income and consumption variation, 
leads the authors to conclude that the upward trends in both earnings and 
consumption variation are not causally related. 
Dynarski and Gruber believe  that their findings raise important issues 
for policy  design.  It is  clear that the tax and transfer system plays  an 
important role in consumption smoothing,  in particular, for the unem- 
ployed. Any reform of the system should be attentive to this role. Second, 
while government insurance is helpful, it is far from sufficient to off-set 
the differential abilities of households to smooth consumption. For a sub- 
stantial part of the population, the costs of even transitory earnings loss 
are likely to be severe. 
THE  CONSUMER  PRICE  Index (CPI),  published  monthly by the Bu- 
reau of  Labor Statistics  (BLS),  is  at the center  of  discussions  about 
monetary policy  and is used to adjust many private contracts and gov- 
ernment programs for inflation.  At the federal  government  level,  the 
brackets  of  the  personal  income  tax  and the  payments  under social 
security and other retirement programs are indexed to the CPI. In recent 
years,  a number of economists  have questioned whether the procedures 
used by BLS in computing the CPI adequately capture quality changes xxviii  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
in goods  and services,  including  the quality changes  inherent in new 
products,  and whether  they  properly  allow  for the  substitutions  that 
consumers  make  in the goods  and services  that they  buy.  If,  as this 
questioning  suggests,  the CPI has a substantial bias,  it is not a suitable 
guide for policy  and provides inappropriate adjustments of contracts for 
inflation.  Last year,  the Advisory  Commission  to Study the Consumer 
Price Index, which was formed in response to these concerns,  presented 
its final report, in which  it estimated  that the CPI has had an upward 
bias averaging  1. 1 percent a year. While there is agreement about some 
sources of bias identified in the report, and the BLS is already making 
efforts  to  correct  them,  there  is  much  less  agreement  about the  0.6 
percent  a year  that was  estimated  to  come  from  insufficient  quality 
adjustment. In the fifth paper of this volume,  Brent Moulton and Karin 
Moses  first appraise  the  advisory  commission's  estimates  of  quality 
bias and then analyze  the quality allowances  implicit  in the BLS  pro- 
cedures for replacing items in the monthly surveys that provide the raw 
price data for the CPI. 
The commission  estimated that for nineteen out of twenty-seven  CPI 
item categories,  price increases were overstated because quality change 
was underestimated.  Moulton  and Moses  observe  that the information 
the  commission  brought  to  bear  in  making  these  estimates  differed 
widely  across categories.  In six of the nineteen categories,  it reviewed 
existing  studies  of  bias  for  specific  items  and drew inferences  about 
related items  in the category.  In another four categories,  it conducted 
original  research  or presented  back-of-the-envelope  calculations  of 
likely  bias.  In the other nine categories,  it simply  described  potential 
sources of bias and offered estimates  of their magnitudes.  The authors 
summarize the commission's  estimates  for all twenty-seven  categories 
and discuss  a number of them in detail,  explaining  why they find some 
persuasive  but are doubtful of others. 
For two major components-appliances,  which includes home elec- 
tronics,  and medical  care-Moulton  and Moses  accept  the  commis- 
sion's  conclusion  of upward bias arising from inadequate allowance  for 
quality changes.  They regard the commission's  estimates  for personal 
computers,  television,  video equipment,  and related items as well doc- 
umented  and  note  that  the  BLS  is  improving  the  sampling  of  new 
products and developing  hedonic methods to adjust for quality in these 
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quality  improvements  in medical  care,  although they  are wary of  the 
commission's  estimates of the bias for this category because they were 
based largely  on extrapolation  from studies  of only  two medical  con- 
ditions.  They  note  that the BLS  has recently  changed  its  methods  to 
address some of the issues in pricing medical care, but add that difficult 
measurement issues  remain and will continue to be the subject of BLS 
research. 
The authors criticize  the commission's  estimates  of bias in several 
other categories.  The commission  attributes a bias of 20 percent in the 
pricing  of  fresh fruits and vegetables  over the period  1967-96  to the 
failure of the CPI to properly value increased seasonal  availability  and 
variety.  The authors provide their own model,  based on assumed price 
elasticities,  to  show  that the increased  consumption  of  new  seasonal 
items would have to be implausibly  large to be consistent  with such a 
high bias estimate.  For the shelter category,  which has a huge weight 
(28 percent) in the overall CPI, they use detailed information,  such as 
changes  in apartment size,  to question the commission's  estimate of a 
0.25  percent a year bias in prices.  In fact,  they conclude  that a small 
downward bias is more likely.  For new vehicles,  the commission  esti- 
mates a bias of 0.6  percent a year, based on treating the entire increase 
in  the  lifespan  of  cars  as  an unmeasured  quality  improvement.  The 
authors note that many improvements that are related to durability have 
been explicitly  accounted for, so that allowing  separately for increased 
lifespan  would double count some  amount of quality changes. 
In the apparel category,  Moulton  and Moses  question  the commis- 
sion's  reliance  on Robert Gordon's  study of Sears catalogue  prices to 
estimate  CPI bias.  They  note that the catalogue  study only  measures 
price changes for items that remain identical from year to year, whereas 
CPI research finds that price changes  are correlated with the introduc- 
tion  of  new  fashions  or varieties.  Gordon's  methodology  essentially 
attributes all  price  increase  associated  with  the  introduction  of  new 
fashion  lines  to quality  improvement.  As  evidence  that this effect  is 
important, they observe that Gordon's price index for women's  apparel, 
where fashion changes  are most common,  did not change from 1984 to 
1993,  although the indexes  for men's,  boys,'  and girls'  clothing  rose 
between  14 and 17.5 percent over the period. The authors also provide 
evidence  that the commission  overstates the quality effects  arising from 
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delay in bringing cellular phones into the CPI sample. In the latter case, 
they apply demand elasticity  estimates from Jerry Hausman to the con- 
sumer expenditure share of cellular phones to calculate  a bias of about 
0.02  percent a year in the overall  CPI from this delay.  In their view, 
the fact that ignoring one of the most important new products in recent 
years biased  the CPI by only  this amount casts doubt on many of the 
larger numbers in the commission's  report. 
In the overall  scheme  of collecting  monthly price data for the CPI, 
changes in the items sampled take place through three distinct avenues. 
Essentially  new  items,  such  as  video-cassette  recorders and cellular 
phones,  that do  not  readily  fit existing  item  categories,  are usually 
introduced during the major revisions  of the CPI, when market basket 
weights  for  all  items  are recalculated  and item  classifications  are re- 
vised.  Between  major revisions,  one-fifth of individual  items and out- 
lets are scheduled  to be replaced each year by regular sample rotation. 
And on an unscheduled  but frequent basis,  items that become  unavail- 
able to data collectors  from one month to the next are replaced by item 
replacement procedures. In the second half of their paper, Moulton and 
Moses  describe  the item replacement procedures used by the BLS and 
estimate how much quality change has been implicit in their application. 
Their analysis  does  not encompass  the sample changes  that take place 
with regular sample rotation, where there is little presumption of quality 
change,  nor with  the  introduction  of  essentially  new  items  in  major 
revisions. 
Item  replacement  is  quantitatively  important.  Each  month,  some 
80,000  sample  prices  are collected,  providing  the  raw data for  that 
month's  CPI. But about 30 percent of the items that were due to be in 
the sample throughout a given  year become  unavailable  at a particular 
outlet  and are replaced  with  items  deemed  to be  similar by  the data 
collector.  On the basis of information about the replacement item,  one 
of  several  available  procedures  is  used  to  introduce  it  into  the  CPI 
calculations.  The choice  of procedure determines  the implicit  quality 
change that accompanies  the replacement.  To take the simplest case,  if 
a replacement item is deemed not to be identical to the item it replaces, 
a procedure may be chosen  that ignores  all of the difference  between 
the last price  of  the  old  item  and the price  of  the new  item  when  it 
enters the sample.  In this case,  all of the observed  price difference  is 
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in the CPI. In general,  some portion of the observed price difference  is 
treated as an implicit  quality change  and the remainder appears in the 
CPI as a price change in that month. 
By examining the actual raw price data collected  for old and replace- 
ment items and which procedure was applied to each replacement item, 
Moulton and Moses tabulate how much of the price difference observed 
in the raw data was treated as quality change  and so ignored in calcu- 
lating the CPI. Two  final steps in their analysis  are important to their 
quantitative results.  First,  in addition to aggregating  over all observa- 
tions,  they  also  aggregate  over  subsets  of  observations  truncated to 
remove outliers-that  is,  raw price changes  that appear to be too large 
to represent quality change  in an item and may instead arise from an 
inappropriate substitution  of  a dissimilar  item  by  the data collector. 
They consider two truncations: eliminating  all observations when a raw 
price increases  or decreases  by a factor of 5 or more or by a factor of 
2 or more.  Second,  in processing  the raw data they use both arithmetic 
aggregation,  which  parallels  the procedure used  in aggregating  price 
changes  in the CPI,  and logarithmic  aggregation,  which,  under many 
assumptions  about the generation  of the data, is more appropriate for 
measuring quality effects  captured by BLS procedures. 
The authors present an extensive  analysis  of data for  1995 and also 
report some  results  from  earlier  studies  based  on  data for  1983  and 
1984.  For  1995,  using  all  the  data and arithmetic  aggregation,  they 
calculate that BLS procedures for item replacement led to the CPI rising 
by  1.76  percent  less  than it  would  have  if  all  of  the recorded  price 
difference  on replacement  items had been recorded as price change  in 
the CPI. 
To answer the different question-how  much quality change  is im- 
plicitly being allowed for by these procedures?-the  authors reason that 
calculations  using the truncated data to remove  outliers or using  loga- 
rithmic aggregation  may be more appropriate. Outliers may well  arise 
from inappropriate substitutions,  which should not be counted as quality 
change. This problem is minimized with logarithmic aggregation,  since 
with  many  observations,  large  positive  and negative  outliers  should 
roughly cancel  out. With arithmetic aggregation,  their estimates of the 
quality change allowed for are 1. 10 percent and 0.54  percent, using the 
less  and more stringently  truncated samples,  respectively.  With loga- 
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0.44  percent with the full  sample,  and 0.40  percent and 0.28  percent 
with the two truncated samples.  Though the range is substantial,  each 
of these estimates  indicates  that BLS procedures for item replacement 
have been capturing a noticeable amount of quality change in the market 
basket  that  makes  up  the  CPI.  However,  these  calculations  do  not 
address the issues  raised in the first part of the paper, which  concern 
the possibility  of significant bias from other aspects of the methodology 
that the Bureau of Labor Statistics  uses to calculate  the CPI. 
BRAZIL'S  ECONOMIC  PERFORMANCE  over  the  years  has  been 
volatile,  even  by Latin American  standards. It has enjoyed  extended 
periods of rapid growth and has also stagnated for long stretches.  It has 
long  accommodated  double-digit  annual inflation  rates,  but has  also 
experienced  destabilizing  bouts of hyperinflation.  On many occasions, 
Brazilian  governments  have  tried special  stabilization  plans  aimed at 
curbing runaway inflation while maintaining growth. Most recently,  the 
Real Plan of  1994 has brought inflation down from triple-digit rates in 
1993-94  to expected  single-digit  rates this year, while  continuing  real 
expansion  of  the economy.  In the sixth  paper of  this  issue,  Rudiger 
Dornbusch examines  Brazil's  past performance,  assesses  the potentials 
and risks  of  the Real  Plan,  and suggests  how  Brazil  can improve  its 
growth prospects. 
Dornbusch's  historical  review  emphasizes  the bouts of  inflation in 
Brazil's  past  and its  governments'  attempts to  deal  with  them.  Tho- 
roughgoing  indexation of wages  and price contracts, promoted both by 
law and by long  practice,  is a central feature of the economy.  It nor- 
mally  makes  inflation easy  to live  with,  but also  makes it very costly 
to bring inflation under control  when  it becomes  disruptive.  This  has 
led Brazilian  economists  to seek  "heterodox"  policies  that would co- 
ordinate a stop to the wage-price  spiral through incomes policies,  while 
simultaneously  controlling  demand.  liowever,  in Dornbusch's  view, 
Brazil's  low pain threshold is another key feature of the economy  and 
it explains  why heterodox programs such as the Cruzado Plan of  1986 
and its numerous successors failed.  Rather than applying restrictive de- 
mand policies to reinforce incomes policies,  policymakers saw the initial 
respite provided by the incomes policies as occasions to stimulate demand. 
Against  this background,  the Real  Plan avoided  reliance  on an in- 
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the dollar.  At the outset,  wages  were converted  to reais at a level  that 
required no catchup to past price inflation, and were indexed to inflation 
going  forward.  This,  together with an initial  appreciation of the real, 
abruptly stopped  the  triple-digit  inflation.  Many  dimensions  of  eco- 
nomic  performance  have  since  improved,  and the new  policies  have 
been politically  popular. Inflation has continued to slow,  with the con- 
sumer price index  rising by only  10 percent in  1996.  Real output has 
grown  and real  wages  have  risen  rapidly,  especially  for the poorest 
workers.  In a country with extreme disparities between  rich and poor, 
the ratio of the wages  of the richest  10 percent to those of the poorest 
10 percent dropped from 72  to 49  between  1993  and 1995,  reversing 
the trend toward growing  inequality that had persisted since the 1960s. 
While applauding these achievements,  Dornbusch finds other aspects 
of  Brazil's  economic  performance troublesome.  A sizable  real appre- 
ciation of the currency heads his list of concerns.  He warns that world- 
wide,  large real appreciations have almost invariably ended in external 
crises  when events  have hampered the rollover  of debt and the ability 
to  finance  current account  deficits.  Just how  much  appreciation  has 
occurred and how  much is tolerable  are both matters of dispute.  Esti- 
mates of the extent of Brazil's  real appreciation differ widely,  depend- 
ing on what measure is used. Dornbusch cites a number of alternatives, 
ranging from a modest  6 percent by taking the industrial price  index 
for Sao Paulo relative  to Brazil's  trading partners, to near 50 percent 
by comparing the rise in the ratio of consumer prices to wholesale  prices 
in Brazil,  a ratio often taken as a proxy for the price ratio of nontrad- 
ables to tradables. 
He also notes that although Brazil has started on economic  reforms, 
it still has a long way to go.  Many of these reforms would require real 
depreciation  in order to sustain employment  growth.  Capital markets 
and foreign  trade have already been substantially  liberalized,  and im- 
ports and capital  inflows  have  expanded.  Other reforms,  such as pri- 
vatization,  firm restructuring, and government downsizing,  could even- 
tually improve productivity and permit higher real wages.  But, as with 
trade reform,  they  are likely  to require lower  real wages  in the short 
run in order to reemploy  the workers released  by the reforms and the 
rise  in  imports. 
Dornbusch  is  also  concerned  that,  under the  Real  Plan,  Brazil's 
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inflation,  the government has allowed  real interest rates to rise to very 
high levels.  This  has encouraged  capital  inflows,  but investment  as a 
share of GDP remains relatively low. The current account deficit, which 
was modest to start with,  is growing and is projected to reach 5 percent 
of GDP in 1998. 
Dornbusch offers a colorful  description of the conflict faced by pol- 
icymakers  who have the social  objectives  of high real wages  and em- 
ployment levels but are constrained by the size of the sustainable foreign 
deficit-a  conflict that may soon,  if not already, confront policymakers 
in Brazil.  He describes  an outcome  that meets  the external constraint 
with full employment  but an unacceptably  low  real wage  and labels  it 
the IMF equilibrium.  An outcome with full employment  and a high real 
wage he calls the Latin equilibrium,  because it involves  overborrowing 
to  evade  (for  a  time)  the  foreign  deficit  constraint.  And  he  sees  a 
temporary retrenchment that maintains  a high  real wage  but accepts 
unemployment  for a time as typical of the year before an election,  just 
before  an expansion  starts. For Brazil,  he envisages  two potential  al- 
ternative responses: trade protection or borrowing in the hope that time 
will  somehow  resolve  the conflict,  perhaps through a surge in produc- 
tivity  that reconciles  real wages  and competitiveness. 
Despite his misgivings  about the present course of policy,  Dornbusch 
does  not expect  Brazil to suffer the fate that befell  Mexico  when  the 
peso  became  overvalued.  Rather,  he  fears  that  Brazil  may  muddle 
through for an extended period when it could instead be fostering rapid 
growth.  Such growth would follow  from policies  that encouraged more 
saving  and investment  and less  consumption;  a lower  real exchange 
rate, even  if this invited  somewhat  more inflation than at present; and 
continued free market reforms to enhance competitiveness  and encour- 
age productivity  growth. 